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959 
NOTES 
The Near Impossibility of Pleading Falsity of Opinion 
Statements Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act and Rule 10b-5 
I. Introduction 
Imagine you have just invested in a company with expectations of 
making a sizeable return on your investment. News breaks, and the market 
responds positively to an acquisition. Because of the nature of the 
acquisition and positive future outlook of the assets acquired, a large 
portion of the purchase price is allocated to the goodwill account. This is 
even better than expected, the price of your shares of stock continue to rise 
during a period with a positive outlook and a high valuation of goodwill of 
the newly acquired assets of the subsidiary. Then, with little forewarning, 
the large goodwill account is suddenly depleted over a matter of a few 
quarters, and all the appreciation of the stock is wiped away.  
Now there is concern regarding overvalued goodwill because there may 
have been inappropriate actions during this period that led to the improper 
valuation. You wish to bring a lawsuit against the company and 
management to recover losses resulting from potentially fraudulent actions. 
Because goodwill is considered an opinion statement, the pleading standard 
to allege fraud quickly becomes a minefield that is nearly impossible to 
traverse in order to get past the pleading stage, even if there is illegal 
conduct. At the pleading stage, the defendant has a toolbox full of defenses 
that make getting past the pleading stage to discovery a burdensome task. 
The recent Ninth Circuit decision in City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 
Police & Fire Retirement System v. Align Technology, Inc. adds yet another 
tool to the defendant’s toolbox that makes getting beyond the pleading 
stage in such a case unlikely, which may ultimately allow illegal conduct to 
continue without penalty.  
II. Overview and Background 
The origins of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934 
can be traced back to concerns arising from the Panic of 1907.
1
 The Panic 
of 1907 began when a group of banks failed to obtain control of a mining 
company, leading to significant losses on the New York Stock Exchange, a 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 395-397 (1990).  
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decline in investor confidence, and a call for government intervention.
2
 
Congress formed committees in 1912 to investigate whether key industries 
had become so concentrated that a few people controlled the entire 
economy through their holdings on the New York Stock Exchange.
3
 The 
committees concluded that the exchange operated to the benefit of a few of 
its members and to the detriment of its investors.
4
 The committees likened 
the state of the New York Stock Exchange to manipulation-prone gambling; 
this was a grave concern.
5
 The efforts of the committees proved fruitless, 
however, as Congress took no legislative action in response.
6
 The Panic of 
1907 faded from memory and twenty years of prosperity on the New York 
Stock Exchange discouraged further calls for regulation.
7
  
But the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression brought 
securities regulation back to the forefront of public discussion.
8
 Congress 
first enacted the Securities Act of 1933 to achieve truth in securities relating 
to public offerings; it was designed to prevent the issuers from 
manipulating the offerees in a public offering.
9
 Shortly thereafter, Congress 
enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to regulate brokers, dealers, 
the securities market, and the securities traded in certain markets.
10
 The 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created a periodic disclosure system for 
securities traded on the market.
11
 The purpose of enacting legislation to 
regulate exchange operation was “for the protection of investors, [] the 
safeguarding of values, and . . . the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, and 
destructive speculation.”12 The purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Exchange Act of 1934, coupled with the context in which they were 
passed, demonstrate that the “fundamental purpose, common to these 
statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Id. at 395. 
 3. Id. at 402-03.  
 4. Id. at 403.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. at 406. 
 7. Id. at 407-08. 
 8. Id. at 408.  
 9. Milton H. Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1340, 
1367-68 (1966).  
 10. Id. at 1340-41.  
 11. Shurkin v. Golden State Vintners, Inc., 303 F. App’x 431, 433 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 12. Thel, supra note 1, at 425 (quoting President's Message to Congress, 3 PUB. PAPERS 
90, 91 (Feb. 9, 1934), reprinted in 78 CONG. REC. 2264 (1934)).  
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of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in 
the securities industry.”13  
This is the context in which section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
operates to protect investors. Section 10(b) provides:  
 It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.”14  
Congress enacted section 10(b) to authorize the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to issue rules and regulations “prohibit[ing] or 
regulat[ing] the use of any other manipulative or deceptive practices which 
it finds detrimental to the interests of the investor.”15 Pursuant to this 
power, and to clarify what it considers to be “manipulative or deceptive 
practices,” the SEC devised rule 10b-5 which provides that:  
It shall be unlawful . . . (a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit . . . a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements . . . not misleading, (c) [t]o engage in any 
act . . . which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person . . . .
16
 
A. Elements of a Section 10(b) Claim 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 10(b) allows for private 
actions even though the text of the statute does not do so explicitly.
17
 The 
Court has inferred this right to bring private actions in order to enforce the 
purpose of the statute and to effectuate the overall intent of the provision.
18
 
                                                                                                                 
 13. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); see also 
Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963) (“The benefits which a guarantee of 
procedural safeguards brings about are, moreover, of particular importance here. It requires 
but little appreciation of the extent of the Exchange’s economic power and of what happened 
in this country during the 1920’s and 1930’s to realize how essential it is that the highest 
ethical standards prevail as to every aspect of the Exchange’s activities.”) (emphasis added).  
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 15. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 450 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 18 
(1934)).  
 16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). 
 17. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014).  
 18. See id.  
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The elements of a section 10(b) claim require the plaintiff to prove “(1) a 
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant
19
; (2) scienter; (3) 
a connection between the misrepresentation or omission; (4) reliance upon 
the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss 
causation.”20  
B. Pleading Standards Generally 
In claiming securities fraud, plaintiffs bringing a private action face 
heightened pleading requirements that present large hurdles when alleging a 
violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
21
 Claims of fraud under section 
10(b) and rule 10b-5 must satisfy dual pleading requirements under both the 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
22
 and the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995.
23
 Under the FRCP 9(b), the complaint must “state 
with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” 24 
Therefore, a plaintiff alleging fraud in violation of section 10(b) must plead 
the particular circumstances of the fraud instead of only the typical pleading 
requirements under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).
25
  
In addition to the increased pleading standards imposed by FRCP 9(b), 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLSRA) mandates 
that “the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been 
misleading” and “the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading.”26 
Additionally, the PLSRA requires the complaint to “state with particularity 
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the 
required [scienter].”27 The scienter requirement poses a particularly high 
bar because “to adequately plead scienter, the complaint must now ‘state 
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant 
acted with the required state of mind.’”28 To plead a “strong inference” of 
scienter, the inference “must be cogent and at least as compelling as any 
                                                                                                                 
 19. While this Note will discuss other factors, this is the main element of a 10(b) claim 
that will be discussed.  
 20. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).  
 21. In re Verifone Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 704 F.3d 694, 701 (9th Cir. 2012).  
 22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).  
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B); see also Verifone Holdings, 704 F.3d at 701.  
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). 
 28. Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A)).  
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opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”29 Pleading scienter presents a 
significant hurdle for a securities fraud plaintiff, but that topic is not the 
focus of this Note.
30
  
This Note examines section 10(b) and rule 10b-5’s requirements that a 
plaintiff plead the falsity component, which requires the plaintiff to 
“specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or 
reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the 
statement or omission is made on information and belief . . . state with 
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”31  
It is worth noting the rationale and legal setting in which the PSLRA 
requirements were passed and implemented. Congress was dissatisfied with 
the manner in which courts of appeals were applying FRCP rule 9(b) in 
their application of stating fraud with “particularity.”32 Congress recognized 
and considered the serious nature of being named a party to a suit for fraud, 
and the fact that, if the fraud claims prove unwarranted, serious damage to 
reputation will have nevertheless been done.
33
 Congress was concerned 
with the abuse it perceived in class actions filings in private securities 
litigation alleging fraud.
34
 Congress believed parties were filing frivolous 
suits, driven by lawyers, to target deep-pocket defendants with little merit 
for the claim in order to then make extreme discovery requests.
35
 The 
concern was that such practices were leading to extortionate type 
settlements, which harmed companies and deterred involvement in 
management positions of companies.
36
  
With these issues in mind, Congress passed the PSLRA with the 
“intent[ion] to strengthen existing pleading requirements”37 and balance the 
two goals of the PSLRA “to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while 
preserving investors’ ability to recover on meritorious claims.”38 Thus, 
although the PSLRA increases plaintiffs’ pleading requirements under 
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the requirements have a justification—the 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).  
 30. See generally Michael D. Moritz, The Advent of Scienterless Fraud? Applying 
Omnicare to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Claims, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 595 (2017). 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B). 
 32. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006).  
 35. See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 28. 
 36. Merrill Lynch, 547 U.S. at 81; H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 28. 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41; see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 
551 U.S. 308, 321-22 (2007).  
 38. Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 322. 
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regulations were passed in response to abuse and unintended consequences 
of having relaxed rules for pleading securities fraud. The remaining concern 
is the balance between avoiding non-meritorious, harmful allegations while 
allowing merited claims to proceed. The recent decision in City of 
Dearborn Heights shifts the balance further in favor of preventing fraud 
allegations from proceeding beyond the pleading stage.  
III. Law Prior to City of Dearborn Heights: Pleading the First Prong 
of a Section 10(b) Claim Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
A. Falsity and Materiality Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Prior to City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Retirement 
System v. Align Technology, Inc., in order to satisfy the first prong of 
pleading fraud there first had to be a material misstatement.
39
 For a 
statement to be material, there had to be “a substantial likelihood that the 
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.”40 Further, the allegations had to “raise a reasonable expectation 
that discovery will reveal evidence satisfying the materiality requirement, 
and to allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable.”41  
In addition to being material, the statement alleged to be misleading had 
to be a factual misstatement to be actionable under section 10(b).
42
 
Statements of reasons, opinions, or beliefs were considered factual under 
the securities laws, and therefore actionable as material factual 
misstatements by the speaker if “(1) the statement [was] not actually 
believed, (2) there [was] no reasonable basis for the belief, or (3) the 
speaker [was] aware of undisclosed facts tending seriously to undermine the 
statements accuracy.”43  
  
                                                                                                                 
 39. Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557, 568 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled by Dearborn Heights 
Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 40. Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988)).  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 579. 
 43. Id; see also In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 930 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(emphasis added).  
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B. Pleading Falsity of Opinion Statements Under Section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 
The Securities Act of 1933 sought to protect investors by requiring that 
issuers disclose information through a registration statement in connection 
with a public offering.
44
 Liability would be imposed on certain individuals 
if the registration statement “contained an untrue statement of a material 
fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or 
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.”45  
In its landmark decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council 
Construction Industry Pension Fund, the Supreme Court addressed 
pleading standards for plaintiffs alleging violation of section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 based on material misstatements or omissions 
contained in the registration statement filed with the SEC.
46
 In Omnicare, 
the registration statement Omnicare filed with the SEC contained 
statements regarding Omnicare’s belief it had complied with legal 
requirements, for example: “[w]e believe our contract arrangements . . . are 
in compliance with . . . federal and state laws” and “[w]e believe that our 
contracts . . . are legally and economically valid . . . .”47 The plaintiffs 
purchased shares pursuant to the registration statement, and at a later date 
the Federal Government pressed charges against Omnicare alleging the 
contracts discussed in the registration statement violated anti-kickback 
laws.
48
 Thereafter, the plaintiffs claimed a violation of section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 because the registration statement contained 
materially false representations that misled investors.
49
 The Court 
established three standards that apply under different circumstances. First, 
liability under Section 11’s false statement clause will follow if the plaintiff 
establishes that the speaker did not subjectively believe the statement and 
the statement is objectively untrue.
50
 Second, if alleging an opinion 
statement with an embedded fact that is materially misleading, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate the fact supporting the opinion is untrue.
51
 Third, when 
alleging a theory of material omission in the registration statement, the 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Omnicare v. Laborers Dist. Council Const. Ind. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 
1323 (2015); Cohen, supra note 9.  
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).  
 46. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1323-25. 
 47. Id. at 1323.  
 48. Id. at 1324.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 1327.  
 51. Id.  
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plaintiff must show “facts going to the basis for the issuer’s opinion . . . 
whose omission makes the opinion statement at issue misleading to a 
reasonable person reading the statement fairly and in context.”52  
The Supreme Court formulated these guidelines to guide the section 11 
analysis of material misstatements of opinions or beliefs contained in a 
registration statement, and focused on the importance of proving falsity.
53
 
By holding it insufficient to simply allege that the belief is wrong and 
requiring the plaintiff to allege that the belief was not subjectively held, the 
decision prevented investors from “second-guess[ing] inherently subjective 
and uncertain assessments” and protected honest opinions.54 Additionally, 
when the Court required a plaintiff to allege the falsity of the factual basis 
of the opinion to establish liability for an omission, the Court did not 
believe its requirement would prevent “valuable information [from] 
flowing,” but instead felt that it would enhance the information for 
investors.
55
  
IV. Statement of the Case: City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire 
Retirement System v. Align Technology, Inc. 
A. Facts 
This case arose from alleged misstatements in Align Technology’s 
communications and filings with the SEC under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.
56
 Align Technology Inc. (Align)—a public company subject to 
the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934—
“designs, manufactures, and markets” Invisalign, a system designed to treat 
misaligned teeth.
57
 In March of 2011, Align announced the acquisition of 
Cadent; Align intended to integrate Cadent’s design and manufacturing of 
3D digital services and other oral scanners used by dentists and 
orthodontists into their business.
58
 Upon acquiring Cadent for $187.6 
million, “Align allocated $135.5 million of the purchase price [to its] 
‘goodwill’” account.59 $76.9 million of the goodwill was allocated to the 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. at 1332.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1327.  
 55. Id. at 1332.  
 56. City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Align Tech., Inc., 856 
F.3d 605, 609-10 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 57. Id. at 610.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
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goodwill account for “the acquired computer-aided design and 
manufacturing (CAD/CAM) and scanner unit (together with CAD/CAM, 
the SCCS unit).”60  
Goodwill represents “an intangible asset that [is] ‘the excess of the cost 
of an acquired entity over the net of the amounts assigned to assets acquired 
and liabilities assumed’”—it represents value of the company that is 
difficult to quantify and includes items such as reputation, brand 
recognition, and synergy.
61
 Plaintiff alleged that these goodwill allocation 
numbers were based on 2010 inflated revenue numbers due to channel 
stuffing activities
62
 that Cadent participated in prior to the acquisition.
63
 The 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) require a company to 
conduct annual tests for goodwill impairment.
64
  
Plaintiff alleged multiple instances and factors that occurred between the 
time of acquisition and the time Align impaired the goodwill; these 
allegations included: goodwill overstatement based on inflated numbers, 
integration issues with the SCCS unit, struggles in productivity of the 
SCCS unit during the acquisition and implementation periods, increases in 
competition, change in international sales, and other factors that pointed to 
potential issues with goodwill.
65
 Plaintiff further alleged that there were 
seven false and misleading statements concerning Align’s goodwill 
valuation of Cadent, and that Align intentionally overvalued goodwill, all of 
which injected falsity into statements of the goodwill estimates.
66
 The 
statements all dealt with the analysis of goodwill and indications of 
goodwill impairment.
67
  
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id.  
 61. See In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1212 (S.D. Cal. 2010) 
(citation omitted).  
 62. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d at 610. “‘Channel stuffing’ means inducing purchasers to 
increase substantially their purchases before they would . . . otherwise . . . . It has the result 
of shifting earnings into earlier quarters, quite likely to the detriment of earnings in later 
quarters.” Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 202 (1st Cir. 1999) (inflating an 
earlier quarter’s earnings could have the appearance of higher sales and thus be more 
appealing to a potential acquiring corporation).  
 63. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d at 610.  
 64. Id. at 611 (defining impairment as occurring “when the carrying amount of goodwill 
exceeds” the fair value of the goodwill (quoting FIN’L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION Topic 350-20-35-28)).  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 612-13.  
 67. Id.  
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From the time of acquisition until the third quarter of 2012, Align made 
various statements in filings to the SEC and issued various press releases 
disavowing any goodwill impairment.
68
 In October of 2012, however, Align 
announced they were conducting impairment tests because of SCCS 
performance issues that sparked a 20% decrease in Align’s stock price; 
Align eventually noted a goodwill impairment of $52.6 million in 
November of 2012.
69
 Align then made an additional goodwill impairment 
charge for $36.6 million in January of 2013, followed by yet another 
goodwill impairment charge for the remainder of the goodwill account, so 
that the original $76.9 million of goodwill allocated to SCCS totaled $0 in 
April of 2013.
70
 Plaintiff alleged that failure to impair goodwill inserted 
falsity into their financial statements—thus leading to materially false and 
misleading statements— because of Align’s integration issues and business 
struggles.
71
  
B. Issue  
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s holding that the plaintiff 
failed to state a claim and the dismissal of the case pursuant to FRCP 
12(b)(6).
72
 Because the court was reviewing whether the plaintiff failed to 
state a claim, it was required to determine the appropriate pleading 
standards for section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, particularly for pleading falsity 
of opinion statements.
73
  
C. Holding 
The court held that although Omnicare addressed section 11 claims 
under the Securities Act of 1933, the reasoning in Omnicare applies to 
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 claims.
74
 When the court applied the Omnicare 
standards to the plaintiff’s allegations, it held that the plaintiff pled 
insufficient allegations to state a claim for securities fraud because the 
plaintiff failed to adequately plead subjective falsity.
75
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. at 611-12. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 612, 613.  
 71. Id. at 612.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 612. 
 74. Id. at 616.  
 75. Id. at 617.  
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V. Decision  
The court, analyzing the applicability of Omnicare to section 10(b) and 
rule 10b-5 claims, compared language in section 11 of the Securities Act 
and rule 10b-5, pointing out that both contain “identical limitation of 
liability to ‘untrue statement[s]’ and omissions of ‘fact.’”76 The court 
reasoned that because of this common language, Omnicare standards of 
pleading falsity of opinion statements apply to section 10(b) and rule 10b-
5.
77
 Therefore, when pleading falsity of opinion statements, the court 
concluded the plaintiff must allege that “‘the speaker did not hold the belief 
she professed’ and that the belief is objectively untrue” when relying on a 
theory of material misrepresentation.
78
 When the plaintiff relies on a theory 
that the statement contained an embedded fact that is misleading, it must be 
alleged that “the supporting fact [the speaker] supplied [is] untrue.”79 And 
when the plaintiff relies on omissions theory, then it must be alleged that 
“facts going to the basis for the issuer’s opinion . . . whose omission makes 
the opinion statement at issue misleading to a reasonable person reading the 
statement fairly and in context.”80  
The significance of applying Omnicare to section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 
claims is that under the prior standard, a plaintiff could rely on pleading 
falsity by alleging that “there is no reasonable basis for the belief” under a 
material misrepresentation theory.
81
 But that is irreconcilable with the 
Omnicare standard that requires a plaintiff to allege under a material 
misrepresentation theory that “‘the speaker did not hold the belief she 
possessed’ and that the belief is objectively untrue.”82  
This shift in the pleading standard made it more difficult for the plaintiff 
to claim material misrepresentations that would survive a 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss. The plaintiff alleged Align had no reasonable basis for the 
goodwill evaluations because they were based on inflated numbers, poor 
performance of the SCCS unit, internal struggles in integrating the two 
companies, and significant decreases in foreign sales relating to the SCCS 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. at 616 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2018)).  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. (quoting Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 
135 S. Ct. 1318, 1327 (2015)). 
 79. Id. (quoting Omnicare, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1327). 
 80. Id. (quoting Omnicare, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1332). 
 81. Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557, 579 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled by Dearborn Heights 
Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 82. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d at 616 (quoting Omnicare, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1327). 
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unit.
83
 Even when there may have been a basis to doubt the goodwill 
evaluations under all these factors, however, the plaintiff could no longer 
rely solely on “no reasonable basis for belief,” but, rather, the only way the 
plaintiff could state a claim was to allege that Align did not subjectively 
hold the belief and the belief was untrue—all without the opportunity for 
any discovery.
84
 The plaintiff was unable to allege with particularity the 
actual assumptions that Align relied upon when Align conducted the 
goodwill analysis, meaning it could not show that Align subjectively 
believed it misstated the goodwill account.
85
 Therefore, the court concluded 
the plaintiff failed to allege subjective falsity, and thus its claims under a 
material misstatement theory of liability regarding the statements of 
goodwill were properly dismissed under FRCP 12(b)(6).
86
  
The court also evaluated one of Align’s statements that had an embedded 
fact within an opinion statement.
87
 The statement at issue stated as a fact 
that “there were ‘no facts and circumstances’” showing that goodwill was 
impaired,
88
 and, thus, to properly allege the misstatement of the fact, the 
plaintiff must allege that “the supporting fact [the speaker] supplies [is] 
untrue.”89 The court held that because the plaintiff was unable to allege 
additional facts showing Align did not consider negative factors or that the 
assumptions Align used in evaluation were untrue or that it did not have a 
basis for the evaluation, the plaintiff failed to properly allege falsity of the 
statement.
90
 
VI. Analysis  
The standard set forth in Omnicare, which was decided by the Supreme 
Court in the context of a cause of action under section 11 of the Securities 
Act of 1933, should not be applied to a section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 cause 
of action in the strict sense that the Ninth Circuit applied it in City of 
Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Retirement System v. Align 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See id. at 611. 
 84. See id. at 617; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012) (“[A]ll discovery and other 
proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss . . . .”).  
 85. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d at 618.  
 86. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
 87. Id. at 613-14 (“Statement 2: (Form 10-K, filed February 29, 2012): ‘[D]uring the 
fiscal year ended December 31, 2011, there were no facts and circumstances that indicated 
that the fair value of the reporting units may be less than their current carrying amount.’”). 
 88. Id. at 616 (quoting Omnicare, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1327). 
 89. Id. at 614.  
 90. Id. at 619.  
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Technology, Inc. In determining the applicability of Omnicare to section 
10(b) and rule 10b-5, the court overlooked many differences between the 
two causes of action, and seemed to consider the standard applicable based 
on similar language between the two provisions—they both share a material 
misstatement or omission element—while ignoring the many differences 
between the claims.
91
 The court also relied on the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Tongue v. Sanofi,
92
 which determined that Omnicare’s pleading 
standards applied to a section 10(b) cause of action because Omnicare 
“refined the standard for analyzing whether a statement of opinion is 
materially misleading.”93 The Second Circuit in Tongue pointed out that 
section 10(b) claims require a showing of scienter whereas claims under 
section 11 do not, but did not inquire into whether or not the differences 
between the two sections should lead to a determination that Omnicare’s 
section 11 analysis should be applied to section 10(b) claims.
94
 This 
concern was expressed by Judge Kleinfeld in City of Dearborn Heights in a 
concurring opinion.
95
 Judge Kleinfeld cautioned that there are material 
differences between section 11 and section 10(b), and a further inquiry, 
debate, and deliberation over the applicability of Omnicare to section 10(b) 
and overturning precedent should have waited until the issue needed to be 
determined.
96
  
A. Differences Between Section 11 and Section 10(b) 
1. Location of the Misstatement or Omission 
Examination of section 11, section 10(b), and rule 10b-5 raises some 
concerns regarding the need for different pleading standards for pleading 
falsity under the two provisions. Section 11 imposes civil liability “[i]n case 
any part of the registration statement . . . contained an untrue statement of a 
material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated [in the 
registration statement].”97 Section 11 is intended to ensure compliance with 
the registration and disclosure provisions by imposing liability on the actors 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See id. at 616.  
 92. Id.; Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 93. Tongue, 816 F.3d at 209.  
 94. Id.  
 95. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d at 623-24 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (explaining he 
would uphold the decision based on the scienter requirement alone, and leave the application 
of Omnicare to section 10(b) claims for further debate).  
 96. Id.  
 97. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).  
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and participants in the registration process.
98
 Section 10(b) has no such 
requirement that the falsity be contained in a certain document or filing. 
Instead, a cause of action arises under section 10(b) “by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce . . . [t]o use or employ . . . 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.”99 Rule 10b-5 
elaborates “by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact.”100 Whereas section 11 was intended to ensure 
compliance with the registration requirements, section 10(b) serves as a 
“catch-all antifraud provision.”101  
Because section 11 claims are limited to the registration statement 
instead of the broader section 10(b) claim, the plaintiff will be able to allege 
more specifics. The registration statement will be carefully crafted with any 
opinion statements contained therein being mulled over by the speaker. A 
plaintiff will be able to allege with more details regarding the carefully 
crafted registration statement instead of the wide array of statements that 
could fall under a section 10b claim that may not have the sufficient 
detailed factual background required to allege subjective belief 
particularities.  
2. Who Can Be Held Liable and By Whom?  
Section 11 limits which actors can be held liable for the material 
misstatement or omission. Liability is limited to certain enumerated parties 
that include: all those who signed the registration statement, directors of the 
issuer, experts who certified parts of the registration statement, and every 
underwriter of the offering.
102
 In addition, section 11 expressly exempts 
parties that resign from participating in the offering or parties who are not 
experts of the particular provisions in question from liability for 
misstatements or omissions in the registration statement.
103
 Section 10(b) 
and rule 10b-5 contain no such restrictions on who can be liable, rather, 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381 (1983) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 73-85, at 9 (1933)) (“Section 11 creates ‘correspondingly heavier legal liability’ in line 
with responsibility to the public.”). 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).  
 100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).  
 101. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382. 
 102. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). 
 103. Id. § 77k(b).  
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“any person” who makes the misstatement can be subject to liability under 
these provisions.
104
  
In order to have standing under section 11, “the pool . . . has been 
defined narrowly.”105 Because of the nature of the claim in alleging 
misstatement in the registration statement, the scope is limited to persons 
who purchased in the offering or shares that are traceable to the offering 
pursuant to the registration statement that contained the alleged 
misstatement.
106
 However, section 10(b) is a relatively broad “catch-all” 
antifraud provision that contains a broader scope of potential plaintiffs with 
standing to bring suit and is limited to persons who have purchased or sold 
the security in connection with the fraud.
107
  
3. Plaintiff’s Burden 
Section 11 provides a limited scope for liability in terms of what the 
misstatement must be, who can be liable, and how much liability may be 
imposed, whereas section 10(b) is much broader. Thus, while “[section] 11 
places a relatively minimal burden on a plaintiff,” section 10(b) claims 
place a higher burden on plaintiffs to restrict 10(b)’s applicability.108  
For section 11, the plaintiff carries a lighter burden to allege it purchased 
“a security issued under a materially false registration statement.”109 The 
plaintiff must simply prove the registration statement contained a materially 
false statement or omission and that it purchased securities under such 
registration statement.
110
 While a plaintiff need not purchase directly in the 
offering, one of the most challenging obstacles in a section 11 cause of 
action is tracing the shares back to the registration statement when the 
shares are purchased in the secondary market.
111
 Unless the registration 
statement contains indicia of fraud, then there are no additional pleading 
requirements that must be met under section 11; therefore FRCP rule 
8(a)(2) general pleading standards will apply, meaning section 11 itself 
                                                                                                                 
 104. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  
 105. Todd R. David, Heightened Pleading Requirements, Due Diligence, Reliance, Loss 
Causation, and Truth-on-the-Market-Available Defenses to Claims Under Sections 11 and 
12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 53, 60 (2010).  
 106. Id.  
 107. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j; Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382.  
 108. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382. 
 109. See In re Century Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 729 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 110. See id.  
 111. See id.  
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generally does not impose heightened pleading standards.
112
 The imposition 
of the Omnicare standards adds an additional burden, but pleading a section 
11 cause of action still faces fewer hurdles when compared to a section 
10(b) cause of action. In Omnicare, the Supreme Court recognized the 
burden that would be placed on plaintiffs by stating that it will be “no small 
task for an investor” to meet the standard.113 This shows that, even in a 
section 11 cause of action, Omnicare is considered to impose a stringent 
requirement.
114
 
Section 11 requirements stand in stark contrast to the requirements for a 
cause of action under section 10(b). The section 10(b) requirements include 
“(1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection 
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a 
security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”115 In 
addition, because plaintiffs are alleging fraud they must meet the 
requirements to state with particularity their claims alleging fraud under 
FRCP 9(b) and the PSLRA.
116
 The most significant requirement that often 
poses the most difficulty for plaintiffs is the requirement to plead particular 
facts leading to prove scienter,
117
 whereas the most difficult task under 
section 11 is tracing the shares being sold pursuant to the registration 
statement in question.
118
 Additionally, while the requirements at the 
pleading stage are heightened under FRCP 9(b) and PSLRA, a plaintiff’s 
complaint must still fall in line with FRCP 8(a)(2) and avoid what has been 
termed “puzzle pleading.” “Puzzle pleading” has been held to violate FRCP 
8(a), and is present where the complaint contains, for example, large lists of 
challenged statements followed by various reasons why they are misleading 
without specifically allocating reasons to each statement.
119
 To reach the 
level of “puzzle pleading” the complaint has to be fairly extreme and a 
complaint will not easily rise to that level; however, puzzle pleading 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Align Tech., Inc., 
856 F.3d 605, 624 (9th Cir. 2017) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring); see also David, supra note 
105, at 60. 
 113. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr., 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1332 (2015). 
 114. See id. 
 115. Or. Pub. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Apollo Grp. Inc., 774 F.3d 598, 603 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008)).  
 116. See supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text.  
 117. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983). 
 118. See In re Century Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 729 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 119. See, e.g., W. Pa. Elec. Emps. Pension Fund v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No. 316-CV-
470-PK, 2017 WL 3668957, at *18-19 (D. Or. 2017); In re Splash Tech. Holdings, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2001).  
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presents another balance for plaintiffs’ complaints—to plead with enough 
particularity to satisfy PSLRA and FRCP 9(b) while avoiding “puzzle 
pleading.” 
B. Implications of Applying Omnicare Standards to Section 10(b) Falsity 
of Opinion Statements 
Because of the broad applicability of section 10(b), a broad range of 
possible parties could have standing to sue and liability can reach “any 
person.” So it follows that there needs to be additional pleading 
requirements to narrow the cause of action, especially because of the 
seriousness of the allegations of fraud. But under City of Dearborn Heights, 
the task of pleading a cause of action for falsity of opinion statement for 
material misrepresentation under section 10(b) could be approaching a 
point where the cumulative effect of the requirements run contrary to the 
foundational purpose of the securities laws to protect investors, ensure 
accurate disclosure, and preserve the integrity of the markets.
120
 In addition 
to alleging specific facts necessary to establish scienter, plaintiffs must also 
state with particularity that the assumptions relied on for the misstatement 
were not actually held by the speaker—all at the pleading stage.121 In 
Omnicare, the Court recognized that it would be “no small task for an 
investor” to identify particular facts going to the basis for and subjective 
belief of the opinion statement.
122
 While the Court recognized they were 
making it no small task for investors, this was in relation to a section 11 
claim—which has much lighter pleading requirements and a more narrowly 
tailored cause of action to start with.
123
 Conversely, even before the 
Omnicare standards were applied to section 10(b) pleading, it was already 
no small task for the investor to make it through the pleading stages 
because of the multiple elements to allege a 10(b) claim and the already 
heightened pleading standard.  
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit in the justification for 
applying the Omnicare standards because it determined that Omnicare 
simply “refined the standard for analyzing whether a statement of opinion is 
                                                                                                                 
 120. See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 
(1971); 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) (“for the protection of investors”); see also Thel, supra note 
1, at 425. 
 121. See City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys., v. Align Tech., Inc., 
856 F.3d 605, 612 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 122. Omnicare, Inc., v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 
1338, 1332 (2015). 
 123. See id. 
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materially misleading”; and sound statutory interpretation demands that 
section 11 impose the same requirements in the section 10(b) context.
124
 
However, there are reasons that terms or phrases, particularly within 
securities laws, should be interpreted differently—interpretations should 
fall in line with congressional intent.  
VI. Conclusion 
Courts need to undertake a more thorough analysis in their application of 
Omnicare standards to falsity of opinion statements under section 10(b). In 
City of Dearborn Heights, the Ninth Circuit applied the Omnicare standards 
to a case where, as pointed out in the concurrence, it was not needed. The 
court rushed through the analysis of applying Omnicare, did not consider 
the cumulative effect of such a move, and failed to analyze how the 
differences in a section 11 claim and section 10(b) claim might give rise to 
the need for different pleading standards. The type of misstatement, the 
context, the parties involved, and the existing pleading requirements are 
inherently different in the two claims, and thus necessitate different 
pleading requirements. Since a registration statement is narrowly tailored 
and a plaintiff has a low burden to allege a section 11 claim, the opinion 
statements in a registration statement deserve some level of added 
protection. After all, they are opinion statements, and liability should not 
flow simply because of an incorrect opinion.
125
 However, in alleging a 
section 10(b) claim, there are already multiple levels of protection in place 
for opinion statements through the heightened pleading requirements and 
the multiplicity of elements that have to be alleged in comparison to section 
11.
126
 A thorough consideration and analysis of the differences and total 
effects is needed to ensure that the correct balance is struck between 
preventing meritless claims from proceeding to the discovery stage and 
allowing claims that have merit to continue. In striking this balance, the 
application of Omnicare to section 10(b) claims makes it even more 
difficult for a plaintiff claiming a falsity of opinion statement to survive a 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because they now have to allege that the speaker 
did not subjectively believe the opinion statement. Further, the plaintiff 
must do so with particularity, while satisfying FRCP 9(b) and PSLRA, 
along with the other five elements of a section 10(b) claim—all without any 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Allign Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d at 616 (quoting Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199, 209 (2d 
Cir. 2016)).  
 125. See Omnicare, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 1327. 
 126. See supra Section V.A. 
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discovery. It can be argued that City of Dearborn Heights is in line with 
congressional intent under the PSLRA to curtail fraud claims without merit. 
And while that may be the case, the question needs to be raised, considered, 
and addressed: at what point does allowing defendants to have a case 
dismissed without much inquiry into the actual facts stray too far from 
protecting investors and ensuring market integrity by limiting fraud and 
manipulation? Because discovery is stayed and the defendant’s toolbox is 
full of defenses during the motion to dismiss, they have a strong likelihood 
of having the case dismissed for a plaintiff’s failure to successfully 
maneuver the minefield of alleging a section 10(b) violation even when 
illegal actions have taken place.  
Thanks to City of Dearborn Heights, defendants now have another tool 
in their toolbox at the pleading stage when facing a section 10(b) claim, 
resulting in the increased likelihood of meritorious claims being dismissed 
on a 12(b)(6) motion. This development cuts against the foundational 
purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
While the tremendous damage that can arise from fraud claims may be 
justification for the heightened pleading requirements, there remains a 
certain level of protection that must be preserved to safeguard investors. 
This issue calls for more thorough analysis by courts before a blind 
application of Omnicare to claims outside of section 11 context. The 
balance between investor protection and protection of the parties making 
the statements must be preserved. 
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
